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Argument obviation 
and switch-reference in Hopi 
LAVERNE MASA YESVA JEANNE. AND KEN HALE 
In this paper we examine the suggestion made in Jeanne (1978) to 
the effect that the phenomenon of subject obviation, more popularly 
termed «switch-reference» (Jacobsen, 1967), belongs properly to the 
general system of grammatical principles which govern ·coreference 
relations among the · arguments of a sentence, Le., to what is now known 
as the Binding Theory within the framework elaborated by Chomsky 
in his Lectures on Government and Binding (1981). We reexamine 
Jeanne's original treatment of Hopi obviation in the light of recent formu-
lations of the Binding Theory and in the light of recent work by Finer 
(1984, 1985) which also seeks to account for switch-reference within 
that theory. 
The generally accepted version of the Binding Theory is that 
presented in (1) below: 
(1) The Binding Theory (Chomsky, 1981: 188): 
(A) An anaphor is bound in its governing category. 
(B) A pronominal is free in its governing category. 
(C) An R-expression is free. 
The following Hopi sentences, and their English counterparts, 
illustrate the functioning of each of these principles: 
(2) (a) Mi' tiyo'ya fee] naa·tuhota. 
(that boy [eel REFL/RECIP-hurt) 
'The boy hurt himself.' · 
(b) Mi' tiyo'ya pu-t tuuhota. 
(that boy him-ACC hurt) 
'The boy hurt him.' 
(c) Pam mi·t tiyo'ya-t tuuhota. 
(he that-ACC boy.ACC hurt) 
'He hurt the boy.' 
In (2a), the object of the verb tuuhota (hurt), represented in syntax 
as an «empty category» (symbolized here as [ec]), is identified as an 
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anaphor (by virtue of the reflexive/reciprocal marking on the verb).
Being an anaphor, this object must be bound in its governing category,
in accordance with condition (A) of the Binding rrheory. The notion
«governing category», in the sense relevant here, can be identified with
the concept «Complete Functional Complex» of Chomsky (1984), defined
very roughly, and minimally, as follows:
(3) Complete functional Complex (CFC):
A is a CFC for B if it is the minimal category containing
(i) B itself, (ii), a governor of B, and (iii) a subject.
Assuming, as is usually done, that the verb governs its object and
that the subject is a constituent of S, not VP, then it is the category
S which constitutes the governing category of the object in (2a), in the
sense relevant to the Binding Theory. The latter is satisfied in (2a) , if
we can assume that the object there is bound to the subject, as we
customarily do assume to be the case for the reflexive relation. We
will adopt the usual definition and notation for the relation bound:
(4) Bound:
A binds B if. A c-commands B and B is «referentially
linked» to (co-indexed with) A.
If an argument is not bo·und, in the sense of (4), then it is free, as
required by conditions (B) and. (C) of the Binding Theory. Sentence (2b)
conforms to condition (B), since the object NP, the pronominal pu-t
(him), is free in its governing category (S). And sentence (2c) conforms
to condition (C), since the object, the R-expression object -i. e., the
overt NP expression mi-t tiyo'ya-t (the boy, accusative)- is free.
The structural configuration shared by the sentences of (2) is
essentially that depicted in (5) below:
(5) 5
1:\
1 : \
I VP \
I 1\ \
I 1\\
NP<a> I \ INFL
NP<b> v
Following Jeanne (1978), we assume that INFL (formerly AUX) is
the head of the category S in Hopi (as is now assumed, within the GB
framework, to be the case for languages generally) and that the verb
heads an autonomous projection VP. That is to say, Sand VP are
projections of the categories INFL and V, respectively. The subject
argument and the VP which is predicated of it are introduced as com-
plements of INFL. And since the object argument is introduced as a
complement of V, it follows that the subject asymmetrically c-commands
the object, as can be seen in (5), where NP<a> is the subject, and
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NP<b> the object. Given these structural relations, according to the
Binding Theory, if NP<b> is an ,anaphor, it must be bound by NP<a>
in (5). By contrast, if NP<b> is not an anaphor, Le., if it is a prono-
minal or an R-expression, it must be free in (5) and, therefore, not
bound to NP<a->. Thus, given the grammaticality judgements and
coreference interpretations attached to the Hopi sentences of (2), it
follows that the -object of the verb must be an anapho'r in (2a) an a
non-anaphor in (2b-c).
The parallel which exists between binding relations of the type
represented in (2) and the coreference relations involved in subject
obviation, or switch-referellce, is illustrated by the sentences of (6)
below:
(6) (a) 'I-pava paki-t puu' pam qatuptu.
(my-OBro enter-PROX then he sat)
(When my brother entered, he (my brother) sat down.'
tMy brother came in and sat down.'
(b) tI-pava paki-q puu' pam qatuptu.
(my-OBro enter-OBV then he sat)
tWhen my brother came in, he/she (not my brother)
sat down.' ,
(c) Pam paki-q puu' 'i-pava ,qatuptu.
(he enter-OBV then my-OBro sat)
tWhen he/she (not my brother) came in, my
brother sat down.'
We assume here, as is usually done, that the first -clause in these
Hopi sentences is subordinate to the second. The relevant coreference
relations are those holding between the subordinate-clause subject. and
the matrix-clause- subject. In (6a), the first is necessarily interpreted
as coreferential with the second, while in (6b-c), the wo subjects are
necessarily disjoint. This situation is, of course, closely similar in na-
ture to the binding relations which hold in the sentences of (2), and
it is reasonable to expect that the Binding Theory is at work here as
well. ~
It is evident, however, that the Binding Theory cannot carry over
directly and straightforWardly to the coreference relations involved in
so-called switch reference. First, while the NP expression 'i-pava (my
brother) is necessarily coreferential with the subject of the matrix clau-
se in (6a), we cannot say that it is bound, in the sense of the Binding
Theory. It is inherently an R-expression and not an anaphor. Therefore,
if it were bound, we would have a straightforward condition C viola-
tion - condition C is otherwise inviolate' in Hopi, as can be seen by
the ungramm~ticality which results if, for example, an R-expression
is substituted for the empty category object in (2a). Second, it is most
unlikely that a c-command relation (in either direction) holds between
the arguments involved in subject obviation of the type represented
in (6) - hence, the binding relation is technically impossible there.
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And, as just noted, c-command between the subjects would lead imme-
diately to conditio·n C violations in 'cases of subject coreferenc'e.
It seems most reasonable to assume that the dependent clauses
in the' sentences of (6) are adjuncts, rather than daughters, to S (cf.
Jeanne, 1978, for a detailed discussion of Hopi x-theory). Simplifying
somewhat, without loss of essential detail, the structure shared by the
s'entences of (6) is as depicted in (7) below:
(7) s
I \
I \
I 5
I I~\
/ I: \
CP I VP IN~L
I \ N~<a)
I \
5 C (OMP')
/~\
I : \
/ VP INFL
NP<b)
Under «strong) c-command (according to which A c-commands B
if the first branching node dominating A also dominates B; cf. Reinhart,
1976), NP<a> does not c-command NP<b>.The latter cannot, the-
refore, be bound to the fo'rmer. This is fortunate, since otherwise the
perfectly grammatical Hopi sentence (6a) wo·uld be in violation of con-
dition C, in defiance of the facts regarding that condition elsewhere in
Hopi and in defiance of what has been found to hold quite generally in
languages of the world. We are left, however, with an as yet unexplained
similarity between subject obviation (i.e., switch-reference) and the ca-
nonical situation, illustrated ·by (2), in which the Binding Theory ap-
plies straightforwardly.
To put the matter in question form: How do we account for the.
coreference facts of (6) and the like? Is the Binding The"ory involved
in Hopi subject obviation at all? And, if so, precisely how is it involved?
In attempting to answer these questions, we will develop a conception
of subject obviation which combines aspects of the analysis suggested
for Hopi in Jeanne (1978) and aspects of the theory outlined for switch-
reference generally in Finer (1984, 1985).
Let us first examine other Hopi constructions in which the Binding
Theory appears to apply in the expected way.
The sentences of (8) below each contain a postpositional phrase
complement of the main verb yu'a'ata (speak). In (8a), the object of
the postposition is bound by the subject of the m~in verb. In (8b), on
the other .hand, the object of the postposition is free:
(8) (a) Taqa [eel naa..mi yu'a'ata.
(Taqa [ec] REFL/RECIP..to speak)'
CTaqa is speaking to himself.'
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(b) - Taqa pu-t 'a-w yu'a'ata.
(Taqa him-ACe 3SG-to speak)
tTaqa is speaking to him/her.'
The structure shared by these two sentences is essentially as
follows:
, ."(9) s
1:\
I : \
I VP \
NP<a> I \ INFL
I \
pp V
I \
/ \
NP<b> P
The CFC for NP<b> is clearly S, since th~t is the minimal cate-
gory containing the governor of Nr<b,> (Le., P) and a subject (i.e.,
NP<a». Therefore, according to the bi:p.q,ing theory, anaphoric
NP<b> must be bound within S, as is the case in (8a) , while pro-
nominal NP<b> must be free within S, as it is in (Bb). The sentences
of "(8) conform perfectly to the Binding Theory.
The same can be said of the sentences of (10) below, in which the
obje"ct of the main verb kun'tuva (kick) is a nominal possessive
construction:
(10) (a) Taqa [ec] moosa-y kun'tuva.
(Taqa [ec] cat..ACC: PROX kicked)
tTaqa kicked his (Taqa's) cat.'
(b) Taqa pu-t moosa-y-at kun'tuva.
(Taqa him-ACe cat-ACC-OBV kicked)
tTaqa kicked his/her (not Taqa's) cat.'
The structure involved here is essentially that set out in (11)
below:
(li) s
1:\
1 : \
1 VP \
NP<a> / \ INFL
/ \
NP V
-I \
1 \"
NP<b> N
The structural relations in (11) are perfectly analogous to those
iil (9). Accordingly, the CFC for NP<b> is S. Anaphoric NP<b> is
bound in S, as in (lOa), and pronominal NP<b> is free in S, as in
(lOb), in conformity with the Binding Theory.
In relation to the Binding Theory, the Hopi structures (5), (9),
and (11) all share a common characteristic: The morphological pro-
perties of the governor of NP<b> signal the anaphoric status of the
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latter. Thus, for example. if the verb in (5) is marked with the refle-
xive/reciprocal prefix naa- then its object, NP<b>, is an anaphor;
if the verb is not so marked, then its object is not an anaphor. Simi-
larly, if the postposition in (9) is marked with the prefiX naa-, its
object is an anaphor; otherwise, the object is a non-anaphor. Finally,
in the possessive construction of (11), if the head noun is marked with
the obviative element -at (plural -an), the possessor expression gover-
ned by the head noun is identified as a non-anaphor; if the obviative
element is absent, the possessor is an anaphor. This observation led
Jeanne (1978) to propose that a single general principle is at work.
Briefly, the principle is as stated in (12) below (slightly modified from
the original to conform to the conception of Hopi anaphora being
developed here):
(12) The Hopi Rule of Co'reference:
If an X-structure is identified (by the morphological
properties of its head, X) as a-proximate, then its prin-
cipal argument (governed by the head X) is a-anap'horic
and, accordingly, bound (if [+anaphoric]) or free (if
[-anaphoric] in relation to the subject of the minimal
CFC containing that argument.
The tenn proximate here is borrowed from the original AIgonquia~
nist terminology of obviation (see Jeanne, 1978, for discussion). In the
Uto-Aztecan usage, adopted by some linguists, the plus, or proximate,
value of the opposition (glossed PROX) designates the relation in which
one argument is identified as coreferential to another; by contrast,
the minus, or obviative, value (glossed OBV) designates the relation
in which, a particular argument is identified as disjoint in reference
to another. In using this terminology here, we posit a feature [proxi-
mate] which we claim is generally associated with the heads of syn-
tactic categories (being determinable from the morphological proper-
ties thereof and which serves to identify the anaphoric status (i.e.,
status as bound or free) of their arguments.
The Hopi Rule of Coreference, in conjunction with the general
Binding Theory (1), correctly accounts for the coreference facts of the
sentences of (2), (8), and (10). It does not, however, immediately account
for the coreference facts of subject obviation sentences of the type re-
presented by (6a-c). In particular, we are left with the apparent paradox
that,the subject,' of (6a)" for ..example, is necessarily coreferential with
the matrix subject while 'not, technically speaking,' bound to the latter.
Our task now" is 'to deteniline,' the manner' in which the Hopi Rule,-
of Coreference extends to., subject obviation.
In each, .0£ :the sentences of (6), ,the' dependent clause is' marked
to indicate the coreference relation which its subject must bear 'in rela-.,
tion to the subject of the-matrix clause. This, we,"',contend'" is simply,_
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an extension of the general Hopi principle of marking the head of a
construction" for obviation (i.e., for a value of the feature [proximate]),
thereby defining the anaphoric status of its complement (Le., its «prin-
cipal argument»] in the terminology of (12) above). The elements which
effect this marking in (6) are the [+proximate] complementizer -t
(appearing in (6a); this is just one of a larger system of proximate
complementizers; cf. Jeanne, 1978, for more detail), and the obviative,
or [-proximate] complementizer -q (appearing in (6b-c). We follow
Finer (1985) in identifying these elements with the category «comple-
mentizer» (COMP, or simply C), and we assume further, as Finer and
others have done, that the complementizer fits into the x-theory in
the usual way. Thus, the category C(OMP) heads a phrasal projection
CP, and its complement (Le., the principal argument of CP) is the
sentence, S. These structural relations are included in (7) above; we
repeat the essential substructure in (13) below:
(13) I
cp'
I \
I ,
S C
I:'
I : \
I VP INFL
NP<b>
If C is [+proximate] (e.g., at, as in (6a)), then its complement is
anaphoric, and therefore bound in its CFC. Notice, however, that the
complement of C is not the subject of the dependent clause (NP<b»
but rather S, the clause itself. What does it mean to say that the S·
in a proximate structure is bound? This is the key question in arriving
at a conception of subject obviation as a natural extension of the Bind-
ing Theory, which normally concerns itself with coreference relations
among. arguments in the standard sense (Le., NP arguments of verbs).
The answer lies in the nature of the category S. If, as originally sug-
gested in Jeanne (1978), the head of S is INFL, then, to say that S is
bound in a' given structure is to say that INFL is bound. But what
does it mean to say that INFL is bound? In Hopi, as in most languages
in .which it is an autonomous category, INFL contains elements iden-
tifying certain properties of its two complements, the VP and the NP
subject. Thus, it contains an element, sometimes abbreviated Tns, de-
fining the tense category of the verb; and it contains an element, often
labeled AGR for «agreement», which identifies one or more (pro)nomi-
nal features of the subject. In the Hopi sentences used so far in illus-
tration, the category INFL is, in fact, phonologically non-overt, due
simply to the fact that the tense category of the illustrative sentences
is consistently non-future (always marked by zero) and the subjects
are consistently singular in number (also marked by zero). There are,
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however, overt occurences of INFL in Hopi - e.g., in the category of
tense, -ni (future', -ngwu 'usitative'. The INFL element which. is relevant
to our discussion is AGR. In Hopi, the number category of the subject
is marked in INFL. Although it has a number of distinct morphophono-
logical realizations (see, for example, Hale, Jeanne, and Pranka, 1984),
the regular pattern marks the opposition by means of the suffix -ya,
for plural, and the zero element, for non-plural, as illustrated in (14)
below:
(14) (a) Puma hohonaq-ya.
(they play-PL)
<They are playing.
(b) Pam hohonaqa.
(he/she play: NONPL)
tHe/she is playing.'
We wish to suggest that it is the AGR element in INFL which is
identified as bound or free by the obviation system inherent to the
governing C in Hopi. That is to say, if C is [+proximate] in (13), then
the AGR component of INFL is [+anaphoric]; and conversely, if C is
[-proximate], then AGR is [-anaphoric].
The question now is this: if AGR is bound in a given instance,
what is it bound to? And if AGR is free, what is it free in relation to?
The answer to this is relatively straightforward, given a slight,
though rather natural, extension of conventional notions. First, the
binder of AGR must t-command it, by definition. If we look at the
structure given at (7) above, we see that the matrix S stands in precisely
the right structural position to bind the subordinate S. The relevant
portion of (7) is repeated here for convenience:
(15) 5
/ \ .
/ \
Cp Sea>
/ \
/ \
S<b> C
Clearly, S<a> c-commands S<b>. The former could, therefore,
bind the latter. Of course, we are claiming that the relevant binding
relation here involves AGR. But this is a feature of S, by virtue of
the fact that S is a projection of INFL, of which AGR is a component.
And this is the sense in which we m,aintain that S<b> is bound (or
free, as the case may be) iri relation to S<a>. If AGR of S<b> is
identified as anaphoric, it is bound to AGR of S<a>; if AGR- of S<b>
is non-anaphoric, then it is free in relation to AGR of S < a> .
If this is the correct idea for subject obviation in Hopi, then it
will follow automatically from the Hopi Rule of Coreference (12), pro..
vided we extend the notion subject to include not only [NP, S] -but
also AGR (cf. Chomsky, 1981, in which the notion «SUBJECT» (upper
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case), introduced into the Binding Theory to handle certain problems
of English, subsumes AGR as well as the traditional «subject»). This
extension is not unreasonable in view of the fact that AGR does, in
fact, represent certain features of the subject.
We assume that the agreement helation which holds between
AGR and the subject NP is a form of identificatio'n, of AGR with the
subject. It is by virtue of this identification that the coreference rela-
tions found in sentences of the type represented by '(6a-c) are defined.
Thus, for example, the subject of the dependent clause of (6a) is neces-
sarily coreferential with the matrix subject because it is identified with
the dependent AGR which, in turn, is bound tho the matrix AGR with
which the matrix subject is identified.
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